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Abstract 
This study endeavors to investigate causes of default in microfinance programs. The 
problem identified was that microfinance programs perform poorly because of slow 
repayment and high default rates. Hence, it was important to establish if these limitations 
prevailed in the DECSI schemed by determining the average repayment delay and default 
rate and the causes of the observed trends. In order to address those issues, the 
researcher used questionnaires and conducted interview with the relevant company 
managers and referred secondary data sources. The collected data and information were 
compiled and analyzed for possible indications of problem areas. The results reveal that 
the board has an average repayment delay of 31.4 percent. The default rate increased 
over the review period and averaged 57.41 percent as well. The main cause of default 
was found to be poor business performance, in terms of low profitability or business 
losses. Loan diversion to unprofitable uses, domestic problems, numerous dependents, 
and tenancy problems were other factors that caused loan default. The inability to deal 
with slow repayment and default also was a matter of concern. The study found that 
operations and maintenance resources are too small to facilitate follow-up on loan 
usage, and that management information systems are manual. Such systems do not 
facilitate early detection of potential defaulters and slow-repaying borrowers. Further, 
nonprosecution of defaulters and the perception that government credits are grants 
rather than loans encourage default. The board is also understaffed, and key personnel 
have limited computer skills—factors that cause delays in processing and disbursing 
loans. Study recommendations are geared largely toward improving the board‟s capacity 
to manage the loan program. The board should computerize its management information 
system and build staff capacity in computer applications. Staff strength should be 
increased and sufficient operations and maintenance budgets should be provided. 
Processes should be worked out to identify borrower capacity and any obligations that 
may interfere with repayment. Finally, the board should intensify recovery of outstanding 
balances from defaulters through increased borrower follow-up. 
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CHAPTER I 
 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
    1.1.1 General 
According to Dejene Aredo (1993), (as cited in Jemal Abafita, 2002), Ethiopia is one of 
the lowest income countries in the world. Its economy, which is mainly dependent on 
agriculture, has been hit by several internal and external shocks. Devastating wars, 
frequent draughts, high population growth, distorted investment environment, volatile 
primary product prices, etc have been some of the shocks the economy has been 
experiencing. These and a lot other factors resulted in the decline of the economy as a 
whole, while the living conditions of the population have been continuously 
deteriorating. Specifically during the Derge period (1974 -1991) the Ethiopian economy 
was performing very poorly under a socialist oriented command economy.  
After the fall of the Derge, however, the government of Ethiopia has taken several 
measures to reverse the economic decline and worsening poverty situation in the 
country. According to the report by MEDaC (1999) the Ethiopian economy has 
registered a recovery in economic performance since the introduction of economic 
reform program after a period of stagnation and decline for nearly two decades. 
Although the reform programs and policy changes resulted in economic recovery and 
growth in GDP, the achievement towards eradication of poverty was not satisfactory. 
This is because of the fact that without ensuring adequate private sector activities, 
thereby creating higher employment opportunities, it is difficult to reduce the existing 
unemployment problem in the country (Berhanu, 1999). 
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The unemployment problem in the country has forced a lot of people to join the informal 
sector of the economy. This sector of an economy is said to have a significant role in the 
creation of jobs and income generation for quite a large proportion of the population in a 
developing country like Ethiopia. According to a paper compiled by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (cited in Berhanu, 1999) the number of people earning their 
livelihood from the informal sector activities and small scale manufacturing industries is 
eight times larger than those engaged in the medium and large scale industrial 
establishments (Mauri A,1997). 
Micro credit to farmers and artisans needs to be routed through some voluntary agencies 
preferably of farmers and/or artisans. This has been the findings of almost all research 
studies undertaken in this regard particularly in Asia. The reason is very obvious. Most 
of the farmers and artisans in rural areas do not possess necessary skills and drive to 
transform themselves as viable entrepreneurs. They lack in technical knowledge and 
market intelligence. It is, therefore, necessary that they should get support from within 
by grouping themselves and also by joining with others who have necessary expertise 
and leadership to become better entrepreneurs (Souren Ghosal ,2009). 
A large literature in development economics examines the optimal design of credit 
contracts when clients are unable to provide collateral and there is limited liability. 
However, this literature has paid scant attention to a central feature of the typical credit 
contract offered by microfinance institutions in a group setting (Armendariz and 
Morduch 2005). 
According to Daley-Harris (2006), MFIs are increasingly a central source of credit for 
the poor in many countries. The typical repayment schedule offered by a MFI consists of 
weekly repayment starting 1-2 weeks after loan disbursement. The weekly repayment 
amount is usually calculated as the principal and interest due divided by the number of 
weeks until the end of term and payments are generally collected in a group meeting led 
by the MFI loan officer. Weekly collection of repayment installments by bank personnel 
is one of the key features of microfinance that is believed to reduce default risk in the 
absence of collateral and make lending to the poor viable. On the other hand, it also 
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dramatically increases MFI transactions costs, thereby limiting the set of loan sizes and 
client types that are profitable under this model. 
Despite the sharp disjunction in the predictions offered by the rational economics model 
and the behavioral model, evidence on whether repayment frequency influences default 
rates in microfinance remains limited. Armendariz and Morduch (2005) report anecdotal 
evidence from Bangladeshi microfinance providers suggesting that microfinance 
contracts with less frequent repayment saw higher client default. Mcintosh (2007) 
exploits spatial variation in the repayment schedule associated with microfinance 
contracts offered by FINCA in Uganda to provide a more formal analysis. In 2000, 
FINCA offered clients in the east and north of the country the option to elect (by a 
unanimous vote) to change from the standard weekly repayment practice to repaying the 
loan every other week. Relative to weekly repayment schedule, groups which opted for 
the fortnightly weekly schedule saw lower drop-out and increased repayment. While 
supportive of the predictions from economic theory, the fact that clients chose their 
repayment schedule makes it possible that ―better" clients self-selected into the 
fortnightly repayment schedule. 
  1.1.2 Credit Policy in Ethiopia 
The formal and informal financial sectors are the principal sources of finance for any 
investment or business that can be undertaken at micro, small-scale and large-scale 
levels in an economy. The major financial institutions in the formal financial sector in 
Ethiopia are the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE), the Development Bank of 
Ethiopia (DBE), and other Private Banks. As Dejene (1993) noted, because of the 
elaborate paper work, bureaucratic lending procedures and stringent collateral 
requirements, the institutions do not deliver credit as and when needed. Moreover, they 
operate at high transaction costs. 
During the imperial regime, the banking sector was partly owned by foreigners and the 
lending policy was mainly oriented to financing foreign enterprises and wealthy clients 
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while domestic small borrowers were rationed out and forced to seek credit from 
informal finance (Mauri, 1997). 
During the Derg regime (1974-1991), all financial institutions were nationalized and 
credit was mainly channeled to public enterprises, state farms and cooperatives. The 
provision of credit was not based on economic rationality but entirely on government 
preference. The private sector was marginalized. The discrimination against the private 
sector was not only in credit access but also in interest rate, which was for instance 9% 
for private sectors as opposed to 6% for public industrial enterprises since July 1986 
(Itana, 1994). 
Abreham (2002), as cited in  Jemal Abafita, noted that with the downfall of the Derge, 
the private sector got equal access to credit with other sectors; banks were also given 
autonomy to decide by themselves based on purely commercial criteria and 
establishment of private banks and insurance companies was permitted. As a result, loan 
disbursed to the private sector, which was 49% in 1992/93, rose considerably and 
reached 87.7% in 2000/01. In fact there is still unsatisfied demand for credit from this 
sector of the economy due to inability to meet banks’ lending requirements. 
As Solomon (1996) noted, the banks serve big businessmen and disregard poor 
households as bankable. Many small, creditworthy businessmen, with their viable 
investment ventures, are denied access to institutional credit because they couldn't afford 
the required collateral. He also indicated that, ―Overall; the prevailing operation of the 
formal financial institution in many low-income countries such as Ethiopia is inefficient 
in providing sustainable credit facilities to the poor.‖ Regarding delivery of financial 
services access to institutional credit was very limited in Ethiopia. Because of this 
limited access, the majority of the poor get financial services through informal sources 
like moneylenders, Iqub, Iddr, merchants, friends and relatives, etc. The formal financial 
sources have not been interested in delivering credit to the poor. Even if the banks in the 
country, which are part of the formal financial sources decide to give credit to the poor 
(as in the case some banks have been forced to do so during the Derge regime) their 
outreach was also very limited for long. Thus, delivering financial services to the poor 
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requires an innovative targeting deign and a mechanism of credit delivery that helps 
identify and target only the poor who can take the initiative and sustain productive use of 
loans. 
In recent years, the informal and semi-formal lending institutions (such as Iqub, Iddir, 
moneylenders etc.) are becoming the dominant and important sources of finance for poor 
households in Ethiopia. According to Dejene (1993) these two institutions account for 
81% of the agricultural credit. 
Currently, the establishments of sustainable and profitable microfinance institutions that 
serve large number of poor households have been a prime component of the new 
development strategy of Ethiopia (Wolday, 2000). NGOs have also been directly funding 
microcredit activities as part and parcel of poverty alleviation.  
Although provision of credit to rural agricultural household for purchase of agricultural 
inputs and tools has since long been practiced in Ethiopia, credit schemes targeted at the 
urban or rural poor were non-existent until recently. Since the 1970s; however; some 
NGOs have been providing credit to poor households in some parts of the country, side 
by side with activities like delivering relief and development services (MFDR, 2001; 
Mengistu, 1997). 
Wide scale micro financing begun in 1990, following the credit agreement signed 
between the Ethiopian government and the IDA. The credit program was an urban micro 
financing scheme that aimed at financing the Market Towns Development Project 
(MTDP), whose actual operation begun in 1994 (Mengistu, 1997). 
Since microcredit delivery and saving mobilization in Ethiopia are being carried out by 
NGOs, government departments, cooperatives and others in a fragmented and 
inconsistent way, the government took the initiative to establish a regulatory framework 
in order to facilitate sound development of the microfinance industry. Accordingly, 
proclamation No. 40/1996 was enacted to provide for the licensing and supervision of 
the business of micro financing by empowering the NBE to license and supervise them 
(MFDR, 2000). 
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1.1.3. An Overview of DECSI /the Study Area/ 
 
 
 
 
Twenty-seven MFIs have been licensed by the NBE and started delivering microfinance 
services since the issuance of this proclamation. These MFIs aim at poverty alleviation 
through targeting specific groups (reaching the poor) and group based lending. In a short 
period of time the MFIs have managed to reach a sizable portion of the rural and urban 
poor, and in so doing have gained significant experience (MFDR, 2000). One of the MFI 
so established is Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution (DECSI for short) which is 
operating in the Tigray Regional State of Ethiopia.  
As to the findings in the early 1990s, financial services at the county level at large and in 
Tigray region were very insignificant even in urban areas let alone to cover the rural 
areas. Considering such phenomenon and looking into the series poverty problems 
prevailing among the major portion of the population, Relief Society of Tigray (REST) 
started crediting the poor rural people targeting to arrest poverty prior to the 1990s. The 
good result of the credit services of REST and the seriousness of the poverty of the 
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people gave result for the birth of Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) and 
served for few years. 
DECSI was registered as a Share Company in 1997 based on the proclamation of the 
National Bank of Ethiopia. Since then, DECSI has been mainly working widely in rural 
and urban Tigray for the last 15 years. As indicated on the project proposal document of 
the rural credit scheme in Tigray, the main objectives of the scheme were: 
 To reverse the age-old circle of ―low income, low saving, low investment, low 
income‖ into an expanding system of ―high income, high saving, high 
investment, high income‖ through the provision of credit, technical advice and 
skill training; 
 To eliminate exploitation by money lenders; 
 To create opportunities for self employment for the unutilized and under utilized 
human resource; and  
 To empower the disadvantage groups. 
The organization is owned and controlled by its stakeholders, comprising REST, Tigray 
Women’s Association, Tigray Farmers’ Association, Tigray Youth Association, and the 
regional government. As the end of 2002, the organization had more than 100 sub 
branches, which were grouped under nine branch offices and one head office. The sub-
branch is the basic organizational and operational unit. That is, all loans are processed, 
approved, disbursed, and follow-up at this level along with the mobilization of savings 
and deposit withdrawal services (AEMFI.2000)  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
8 
 
                            Table 1.1. Maximum Loan Size and Loan Term 
Type of Loan 
Products  
Maximum loan size  
(Birr)  
Maximum loan term  
Per product(Months)  
General Loan  5,000  12  
Agricultural Loan  5,000  12  
Input Loan  350  8  
Civil Servant Loan  Five times his/her 
monthly salary but 
should not exceed 8000 
birr.  
24 
                                                 Source: DECSI Website statistics 
Currently, DECSI provides different financial services in the rural and urban areas of 
Tigray. Loan, savings, and pension services are the main products offered by the 
institution. The loan product has three forms, which are: regular loan to regular clients; 
in-group collateral system with a loan size ranges between Birr 500 and Birr 5000. The 
second loan product is input loan; which is mainly to rural clients in the form of 
fertilizers and improved seeds. And the third loan product is civil servant loan which is 
mainly aimed at provision of financial services to the civil servants in the region, 
especially to those who are in the remote rural area of the region to meet their demand 
for financial services. The second product type is savings which has two forms, namely: 
voluntary savings (also called individual saving) and compulsory saving which is also 
sub-divided in to two categories: group saving and center saving. Pension service is the 
third product line on which DECSI is engaged i.e. it serves as agent for the social 
security authority to effect pension payment to the pensioners in the region. 
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Impacts of DECSI’s Programs 
 Up to now Birr 4 Billion loan is disbursed out of which Birr 2.8 Billion is given 
particularly for agricultural production. 
 At least 464,622 persons are interacting possessing money. 
 To over 281,000 household saving clients, DECSI has played significant role in 
introducing saving tradition. 
 The institution has 2000 employees which created wide employment opportunity 
in the region. 
 Currently DECSI is providing financial services through 115 sub-branches, 8 
main branches and 15 microfinance-collateral based branches. 
 DECSI is providing fast and efficient financial services to different sectors of 
agriculture, service, handcrafts, trade and industry. 
 It has also built its own standard offices in major towns of Tigray so that it can 
facilitate any banking services.  (see from www. Decsi.com.et/brochure) 
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 The performance of the institution in terms of outreach and by product type as of 
December 2008 is quantitatively shown below 
Table 1.2. Outstanding portfolios as of December 2008 
NO Type Outstanding amount in 
million 
No of Clients 
1 Regular loan 160,715,862 60,619 
2 Rural household 
package 
693,708,445 313,598 
 
3 Urban package loan 52,786,606 21,535 
4 Agricultural input loan 5,025,301 38,455 
5 Business loan 354,707,268 4,578 
 
6 Housing loan 118,427,777 4604 
7 TVET loan 2,196,141 625 
8 Cooperative loan 1,498,622 100 groups 
9 Micro leasing loan 27,172,771 297 
10 Total 459,217,367 464,622 
11 Net Saving 397,684,513 281,000 
Source: Available at www. Decsi.com.et/brochure 
 
    1.2. Statement of the Problem 
An overwhelming majority of the world's poor live in the Third World countries. 
Various approaches have been employed in alleviating poverty of which provision of 
credit that targets the poor is one. Many are now of the opinion that allowing the poor to 
have command over resources through credit can contribute towards poverty alleviation. 
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Gibbons (1992) argues that the best way to do something about poverty is to let the 
people do their own thing. Nobody will have more motivation to change his situation 
than the sufferer himself. 
It is generally accepted that credit, which is put to productive use, results in good returns. 
But credit provision is such a risky business that, in addition to other reasons of varied 
nature, it may involve fraudulent and opportunistic behavior. The lender in the formal 
financial system is at a disadvantage of information on the borrower's behavior. 
Fortunately, group based micro financing system that involves peer pressure and joint 
liability has evolved to counter the problems of a conventional bank that provides a 
collateral backed credit alienating the poor (Mengistu, 1997). 
The performance of most microfinance programs, however, has not been encouraging. 
Many have been plagued with such problems as high default rates, inability to reach 
sufficient numbers of borrowers, and a seemingly unending dependence on subsidies. 
Few of them have lived up to their original objective of "including the excluded" (Bhatt, 
1997). 
For such MFIs to be successful, they should be sustainable both financially as well as 
institutionally. On top of sustainability, one has to include developmental effects like 
income on the target group as core measure of success. For agencies that are involved in 
the development or in assisting the development of a microcredit institution, it is 
recommended that profitability and sustainability should be the final goals, and 
therefore, the only indicators of success (Rudkins, 1994).Although the performance of 
the MFIs in Ethiopia has been impressive since their establishment, they are 
experiencing default problems’.  
Hunte (1996) argues that default problems destroy lending capacity as the flow of 
repayment declines, transforming lenders into welfare agencies, instead of a viable 
financial institution. It incorrectly penalizes creditworthy borrowers whenever the 
screening mechanism is not efficient. Loan default may also deny new applicants access 
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to credit as the bank's cash flow management problems augment in direct proportion to 
the increasing default problem. 
Despite its remarkable achievements, there remained several weaknesses in microfinance 
that need to be improved to ensure its continuous development and successful 
implementation. A critical aspect of microfinance that needs to be focused on is the risks 
management aspect. Microfinance is entrapped by various types of risks, such as default 
risk (Goetz and Gupta, 1995), disaster risks (Kumar and Newport, 2005), currency risk 
(Lewis, 2005), interest rate risk (Hughes and Awimbo, 2000; Rahman, 2005) and 
commercialization risk (Micro Banking Bulletin, 2003). This paper focuses on the issue 
of managing default risk in the specific context of microfinance. Default risk is chosen 
instead of other type of risks because default risk has severe negative repercussions on 
the success of microfinance. A series of defaults could lead to liquidity problem in the 
MFIs and would consequently limit the ability of the MFIs to extend loan to other 
recipients. As would be revealed later, due to the serious consequences of defaulted 
loans, the MFIs might resort to various ways to reduce the possibility of default among 
the borrowers.  
It is obvious that many rural credit schemes have sustained heavy losses because of poor 
loan collection. And yet a lot more have been dependent on government subsidy to 
financially cover the losses they faced through loan default. But, such dependence will 
not prove helpful for sustainability. MFIs should rather depend on loan recovery to have 
a sustainable financial position in this regard; so that they can meet their objective of 
alleviating poverty. This study endeavors to investigate causes of default in microfinance 
programs. The problem Identified is that microfinance programs perform poorly because 
of slow repayment and high default rates. Hence, it is important to establish if these 
limitations prevail in the DECSI scheme by determining the average repayment delay 
and default rate and the causes of the observed trends.  
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1.3. Research Questions 
The study tried to answer the following research questions: 
1. What are the factors which influence loan default problem in DECSI scheme?  
2. How efficient the institution is in the process of screening their clients in a way 
that will not jeopardize their financial position due to the default problem? 
3. What is the Effect of Repayment on Enterprises, Families, and the Community?  
4. What is the effect of Non-payment on Enterprises, Families, and the Community? 
 
1.4. Objective of the Study 
The major aim of this study is to identify the causes of loan default in the DECSI 
scheme, and to draw policy implications for the proper utilization of the financial 
resource of DECSI with particular reference to borrowers in Mekelle Town. 
Specifically, the researcher plans:  
1. To identify the factors which are  influencing the loan default problem of 
borrowers financed by DECSI; 
2. To evaluate the impact of DECSI screening mechanism on default; 
3. To assess the effect of repayment on enterprises, families, and the community;  
4. To assess the effect of non-payment on enterprises, families, and the community 
5. To draw policy implications for the proper utilization of the financial resource of 
the country to meet the envisaged development objectives and future 
microfinance practice in the country. 
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1.5. Significance of the Study 
Targeting credit to the poor is one of the several instruments of alleviating poverty. MFIs 
are engaged in providing credit to the poor so that they can generate income and 
employment for themselves. Although some studies have been conducted on the credit 
schemes that targeted the poor in Ethiopia, no empirical study has been done on causes 
of loan default of DECSI so far. So this study tries to provide a detailed analysis on the 
loan repayment performance of DECSI. It also tries to investigate the screening 
mechanisms used by the institution and assess the impact of loan repayment on 
enterprises, families, and the community in terms of reducing poverty. The study results 
will also be used for policy formulation and decision making with respect to government 
microfinance programs.  Further more, the findings will be useful to the government’s 
district trade offices, development offices, and other departments that implement 
government microfinance initiatives. Finally, the study will contribute to the existing 
body of literature and form a basis for additional research. 
 
 1.6. Scope of the Study 
The study focuses on cause of loan default, screening mechanism and impact (which are 
all part of the borrower viability aspect of sustainability) based on data obtained from the 
two sub-branches of DECSI located in Mekelle Town. More over, other schemes are not 
considered in this study. Nonetheless, there is no reason to rule out the possibility that 
the findings of the study might workout for other related schemes. This study is limited 
to the household of Mekelle town, who are participating in the microfinance scheme of 
DECSI. The study focuses on the DECSI covering its performance in terms of 
disbursement and loan recovery from micro entrepreneurs who received financial 
support between the years 2005 and 2009. 
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1.7.  Limitation of the study 
Some of the major reflected limitations of the study are: 
 The time allotted to undertake the research was too short/unexpected; 
 The financial constraint and the problem associated with the external 
environments forced the researcher to limit the sample size and the scope of the 
paper; 
 Limited data sources of the microfinance industry of Ethiopia and lack of 
adequate reports and statements from the institutions engaging in the 
microfinance activity; and 
 Limited coverage of the study, i.e. the study covers only one area of the region in 
which DECSI operates. 
 
1.8 . Organization of the Paper  
 
The paper is organized in five sections. Chapter  one: Introduction; which includes 
Background of the industry, Background of the study area, Statement of the problem, 
Objective of the study, Research questions, Significance of the study, Scope of the study 
and Limitation of the study. Chapter two presents literature review, including Theoretical 
and Empirical Review. The methodology used to collect and analyze data is explained in 
the third chapter, and chapter four deals with the research findings. Chapter five offers 
conclusions and policy recommendations for enhancing the performance of the DECSI 
scheme.  
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CHAPTER II 
Review of Literature  
2.1. Theoretical Review 
2.1.1. Role of Micro credit/finance 
Micro financing, (as quoted by Rose Ajiambo Bwonya-Wakuloba, 2007), is a strategy for 
alleviating poverty. It is broadly accepted that robust, labor-intensive, and equitable 
economic growth combined with larger outlays for social programs (especially directed 
toward the poor populace, now estimated at 1.3 billion people worldwide) is a winning 
formula in the fight against poverty (UN 1997). 
―Microcredit‖ refers to small loans extended to poor people so that they can undertake 
self-employment projects that generate income and enable them to provide for 
themselves and their families. This form of credit is targeted toward people in the lower 
economic brackets of society. Rural-based microcredit programs in particular have the 
potential to help poor people perform some business activities through which they may 
acquire employment as well as income. As such; microcredit provision has been an 
effective development intervention because such services can be directed specifically to 
the poorest members of the population. (Ibid) 
In Kenya, the 2003–07 Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment 
Creation (ERS); policy document has set a target to create 500,000 jobs annually during 
the recovery period. Accordingly, it intends that 88 percent of those jobs be created in 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). These enterprises also are expected to contribute 
to a decline in poverty rates—from 56.7 percent to 51.8 percent. Therefore, provision of 
microcredit is regarded not only as a tool for empowering the poor, but also as an 
instrument for alleviating poverty in Kenya. The strategy paper identified restoring 
economic growth, generating employment opportunities, and reducing poverty levels as 
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key challenges facing Kenya (Ministry of Planning and National Development 2003). 
The paper estimated that SMEs contribute 18 percent and 72 percent to the national 
gross domestic product and employment, respectively, of the targeted jobs were to be 
created in SMEs. Elsewhere, a survey of SMEs identified a lack of access to affordable 
credit as one of the key constraints facing the SME sub sector. Micro credit generally is 
important to the growth and development of micro enterprises. However, many credit 
programs previously viewed the poor as potential defaulters and placed credit programs 
beyond their reach. Even though wide experience today shows that poor people are not 
bad credit risks and that their repayment rates can be exemplary, the poor still are 
considered to be a high-risk credit population, expensive to serve, and unable to pay the 
full cost of credit; they are believed to require government subsidization of credit. 
According to the UN Secretary-General (UN 1997), there is increased interest in 
microcredit to promote growth with greater equity. His report noted that growth occurs 
through empowering all people by increasing their access to all factors of production, 
including credit. The report also observed that poor people’s latent capacity for 
entrepreneurship would be encouraged by the availability of small-scale loans that would 
introduce them to the small-enterprise sector. Microcredit could enable them to be more 
self-reliant, could create employment opportunities, and could release women to engage 
in economically productive activities. 
Very poor individuals are often described as high risk due to their lack of collateral and 
unstable sources of income and hence timely repayment of loans is often not anticipated. 
Holt (1994) and Christen (1997) cite loan repayment as one of the major challenges to 
microfinance, particularly in the Caribbean context, for example, given that a poor 
repayment culture has plagued numerous microfinance initiatives within the region (von 
Stauffenberg, 2000; Lashley, 2004). Dignard and Havet (1995) and ASA (1997) propose 
several causes of default in microcredit, which can be divided into four main categories. 
These are organizational, household/financial, group dynamics and other factors such as 
geographical location and environmental degradation. Christen (1997) observes that 
initially between 1970s and 1980s, the latter three categories were held responsible for 
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high delinquency rates in credit programs for the poor. However, he suggests that 
contemporary microfinance programs have countered this view by demonstrating that 
the responsibility essentially relies upon factors within the control of the lending 
institution, that is, organizational factors such as staff inefficiency and skill as well as 
clear communication of repayment expectations. Despite the various factors influencing 
default in microcredit programs, the current literature generally concedes that high 
repayment rates are a common feature of most microcredit programs (Dignard and 
Havet, 1995; Brau and Woller, 2004). 
As quoted by Desta Asayehgn; In an era of unprecedented world-wide economic growth, 
it is interesting to note that the richest fifth of the world’s people consume 86 percent of 
all goods and services while about a fifth of the world’s poor population (1.2 billion 
people) still live on less than US $1 a day and almost half of the world’s population live 
on less than US $2 a day (UNDP 2002, Gibson, 2009).Poverty is not simply having a 
very low income. It is a multifaceted phenomenon. In addition to low income, poor 
people also suffer from illiteracy, unsafe drinking water, and lack of access to basic 
health services. They live in remote and resource-poor areas. Frequently encountered 
with their vulnerability, the ―chronically poor are unable to develop their personal 
capabilities or provide a good start in life for their children, and often die prematurely of 
preventable causes.‖ (Alston and Shepherd, 2008-09.) 
With the hastening of the global poverty crisis and the absence of an adequate social 
safety net for those marginalized and vulnerable sections of society in the less developed 
countries, a number of researchers have moved beyond the relentless pursuit of short-
term toward long-term anti-poverty, environmentally sustainable paradigms to assist 
chronically poor sectors of society. Though remarkably polarizing issues, in the last 
three decades micro credit programs have been made available to the chronically poor as 
a viable option to involve them in the formal economic sector. It is assumed that the 
disadvantaged groups will become productive members of society if they involve 
themselves in small businesses that may contribute to powerful changes within their 
lives. (1997, Fisher and Sriram, 2002). 
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In formal financial markets, the poor are excluded from establishing their own small 
businesses because they are not recognized as being creditworthy, i.e. unable to save, 
lacking verifiable credit history or goods to offer as collateral to secure loans, forcing 
them to turn to traditional money lenders. (Zamperetti and Franca Dalla Costa, 2008.) 
Recognizing the needs, capacity, and the talents of the poor to repay the loans, micro 
lending programs are loans extended to group members rather than to individuals. In 
view of the contingent group loan approach, it is generally assumed that group members 
would have an incentive to monitor their progress and that this would lead to a greater 
rate of repayment of their loans since each borrower’s creditworthiness would be a factor 
in the overall creditworthiness of the group (Fisher and Sriram, 2002; Stiglitz, 1990; 
Varian, 1990; and Becker, 1991). In short, the success of group lending creates positive 
incentives for members to repay because in case of default, no member of the group will 
receive future loans. For prompt repayment, there is repeat lending to the group. In group 
lending, the probability of moral hazard is largely reduced because all borrowers are 
members of the group and subject to peer pressure, group dynamics, cohesiveness, and 
the ultimate success of each member of the group (Ajit et al 2006). 
In simple terms, microcredit refers to the process of lending small amounts of seed 
money to groups rather than to one person, without collateral, to help poor people to 
establish their own business. Microcredit, especially designed for eco-entrepreneurship, 
encourages innovation in rural and urban areas to produce environmentally friendly 
products for the marketplace. Thus, the philosophy of demand-led microcredit finance 
visualizes the poor not as objects of charity but as socially productive persons. The 
rationale and objective of advancing microloans to the ultra poor is to improve their 
liquidity constraints, create employment opportunities, and induce sustainable incomes 
by engaging the poor in the reinvention of everything from the bottom-up, with limited 
top-down directives. Therefore, the loans accorded to the poor are not only bankable but 
it is assumed that micro-enterprise activities will eradicate poverty and foster sustainable 
development. As argued by Doocy et al, ―Microfinance is a logical approach to 
development because it functions at the grassroots level, can be sustainable, is capable of 
                                                                                                                                        
20 
 
involving large segments of the population, and builds both human and productive 
capacity (summer, 2005).‖ Stated differently, microcredit is an investment in people, the 
poor and their abilities, which sharpens entrepreneurial initiatives, and strengthens 
developing countries’ economies. Microcredit is a vital tool for economic development 
because it enables the poor to build assets, increase income, and reach self-sufficiency. 
Thus, microcredit not only delivers macro benefits but creates a silent revolution in 
poverty-stricken rural areas (Sharma, 2005). 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are seen by many as being overly modest. 
However, it needs to be mentioned in passing that this assessment omits or glosses over 
some of the greatest challenges to lowering the poverty rate. For example, one of the 
most serious issues omitted in the report is the fact that it failed to establish that it is the 
lack of access to land ownership (micro-landowning program) that has caused many 
people to remain in poverty, and that microcredit loans have accomplished very little in 
solving the land ownership systems in developing countries (Prosterman, R. April 2005). 
Instead, the promotion of microcredit ventures in developing countries has the potential 
to create private groups (cutthroat money-lenders), which have vested interests in 
perpetuating the prevailing poverty situation (Elahi, K.Q. and Danopoulos, C. P. (2004).  
Microcredit participants end up borrowing more from other non-institutional sources 
(double-dipping) to reduce their indebtedness, which is a paradox. As it stands now, 
instead of reaching the core poor, microcredit improves incomes of the better-off poor. It 
is more beneficial to borrowers living above the poverty line than to borrowers living 
below the poverty (Hume and Mosley, 1996). As succinctly argued by Kamani, 
―Although microcredit yields some non-economic benefits, it does not significantly 
alleviate poverty; Indeed, in some instances microcredit makes life at the bottom of the 
pyramid worse (2007).‖ 
Contrary to the hype about microcredit being the best way to create jobs, increase 
workers’ productivity, and eradicate poverty, Banerjee and Duflo argue that, ―Although 
some microcredit clients have created visionary businesses, the vast majority are caught 
in subsistence activities. Participants have no specialized skills and so must compete 
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with all the other self-employed poor in entry-level activities (2006).‖ In his critique of 
the newest financial technology of the Washington Consensus, Flynn argues that while 
the technologies are new, the rhetoric is familiar and suggests that we may be seeing a 
new form of green washing or ―charity washing‖ in the making. The risk is that new 
microfinance technologies targeting people with low incomes will be mistaken as 
benevolence. Bankers are not in the business of charity. They galvanize their activities to 
the bottom line generating sufficient priorities to stay in business (2007). In addition, 
Neff argues that micro credit models have been judged disproportionately from a 
lender’s perspective (repayment rates, financial liability) and not from the borrower’s. 
Therefore, according to Neff, micro credits have privatized public safety-net programs 
and stimulated governments to cut their budgets on education, public health, and the 
early livelihood needs of the poor (1996). 
Despite the provocative criticisms enumerated above, the idea of microcredit as a key to 
socio-economic transformation has taken a prominent place in the international sphere. 
A number of voluntary associations, non-government organizations, friendly societies, 
savings and-credit cooperatives, national and regional government organizations, and 
commercial banking institutions have joined hands in providing financial services to the 
marginalized sectors of the world’s developing countries. Nonetheless for microcredit 
programs to alleviate poverty in the long run, the participants need to demonstrate 
sensitivity to the environment and be involved in environmentally sustainable projects. 
(Gehlich-Shillabeer, 2008). 
Currently, it has been reported by Forbes Magazine that two microfinance institutions 
operating in Ethiopia are among the top 50 Microfinance Institutions in the World. The 
Amhara Credit and Savings Institution ranks sixth in the world and Dedebit Credit and 
Savings Institution (based in Tigray) ranks 31st in the world (Nazret, 2009). The Forbes 
Magazine study was focused on the size of gross loan portfolio, efficiency (operating 
expense and the cost per borrower as a percent of the gross national income per capita of 
their country of operation), risk (looks at the quality of their loan portfolios, measured as 
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the percent of the portfolio at risk greater than 30 days), and returns (measured as a 
combination of return on equality weighted for an institution’s over all ranking). 
 
    2.1.2. Strategies to Minimize Defaults 
Because of the vulnerability of the microcredit sub-sector, lending institutions continue 
to adopt different techniques to improve repayment frequency and grant more credit 
access to borrowers who pay their loans on time. 
The Grameen Bank model is cited widely as the most successful microfinance 
institution. The Grameen Bank, founded by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh, emerged 
from pro-poor grassroots institutions. According to this model, the prospective clientele 
is identified after the purpose, functions, and mode of operation are explained to the 
population of the area covered— usually 15 to 22 villages. Identifying clients in this 
manner resolves the problem of direct targeting by specifying the members’ eligibility 
requirements on the basis of asset ownership. Indirectly, the model may make the loan 
amounts small and may lay down conditions (such as attendance at weekly member 
meetings) so that the non-poor are discouraged from borrowing (Hulme and Mosley 
1996). The meetings reinforce a culture of discipline, routine repayments, and staff 
accountability. With such innovative practices, Grameen Bank has risen to fame for its 
performance in targeting and for its low default rates, which average 3 percent. 
The Kenya, Women Finance Trust believes that small loans are expensive to administer 
and that the institution can survive only by charging competitive interest rates, lending to 
women, and keeping defaults to a bare minimum. Women are targeted as clients by this 
trust because they have been found to have a high propensity to repay. 
According to Mann (1993), some lenders prefer known clients to avoid default. People 
on a loan committee will give preference to an applicant with whom they have dealt 
previously. Hence; lending institutions will give money based on previous banking 
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experience with the client. The same study also showed that institutions lend to 
profitable businesses that have cash flow available to pay back the loan. 
Another strategy for dealing with default is lending to groups. The collective coming 
together of individuals is useful in a number of ways, including peer pressure that 
obliges the members to work within agreed norms. Although studies indicate that such 
schemes work well if groups are homogeneous and jointly liable for defaults, the 
practice of denying credit to all group members in case of default is the most effective 
and least costly way to enforce joint liability (Huppi and Feder, 1990). 
 
2.1.3. Three Cs of Microcredit 
Most literatures also describe three ―Cs‖ that should be observed to reduce default when 
providing microcredit: character, capacity, and capital. 
 Character refers to the way a person has handled past debt obligations. Paying 
heed to character includes determining the borrower’s credit history and personal 
background, honesty, and reliability to pay credit debts.  
 Considering a borrower’s capacity involves determining how much debt he or 
she can handle comfortably by analyzing income streams and identifying any 
legal obligations that could interfere with repayment.  
 Capital refers to a borrower’s current available assets, such as real estate, 
savings, or investments that could be used to repay debt if income is unavailable. 
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2.2. Empirical Review 
2.2.1. Repayment Default and Its Effect on Microfinance Programs 
The most dangerous problem a microcredit program faces is repayment default. The 
Association for Social Advancement (ASA, a Bangladesh-based nongovernmental 
organization focusing on microfinance) has pointed out that if the money invested by the 
lending organizations cannot be recovered, the whole program may collapse. 
Any formal lending program directed toward the poor faces a number of challenges. The 
first problem is exact targeting to ensure no Type I or Type II errors, as defined by 
Cornia and Stewart (1992). These are errors of omission of poor people and of inclusion 
of non-poor people. The second problem is screening to distinguish the good 
(creditworthy) borrowers from the bad (not-so-creditworthy) borrowers. This is a 
problem because poor borrowers generally do not maintain any accounts of their past 
business activity or furnish any documented business plan for use of the loan they are 
seeking. Third, the funding agencies may not be able to monitor and ensure productive 
usage of the loans. Viewed differently, the challenge here is determining whether the 
loan application is for the purpose of expanding a profitable ongoing business or whether 
it will be channeled into unprofitable operations. Achieving and maintaining repayment 
discipline is crucial to the sustainability of any microcredit program. Lending institutions 
must make good loans because default without sanctions will damage the people’s 
commitment and the whole program may collapse. 
Generally, the conventional theory of rural development finance shows that rural finance 
in low-income countries has many inherent failures, including low levels of loan 
recovery, insufficient savings mobilization, high transaction costs, and distribution bias 
to relatively wealthier customers. According to Izumida and Duong (2001), exceptional 
success was found in Vietnam. For example, Central Java’s Badan Kredit Kecamatan 
has shown considerable promise in providing the access to microcredit and the 
convenience and flexibility desired by poor borrowers while ensuring the credit 
institution’s financial viability by minimizing administrative costs and imposing interest 
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rates sufficient to cover costs and prevent capital erosion. The bank, however, did have 
problems when it experienced delayed borrower repayments among other failures 
(Riedinger 1994). 
Several factors predispose borrowers to default. Beneficiaries of microcredit tend to use 
their credit for the same limited range of small-scale activities. In any given situation, it 
is likely that only a limited range of economically viable small-scale activities is 
available to the poor and causes of default in government microcredit programs that 
there is a limited demand for the product of any particular activity (Bundell 1997). These 
factors increase poor people’s vulnerability to defaulting. 
 Diagne and Zeller (2001) analyzed the determinants of access to credit and its impact on 
farm and non-farm income and on household food security in Malawi. Their report 
showed that the contribution of rural microfinance institutions to small income holder 
can be limited or negative if the design of the institutions and their services do not take 
into account the constraints and demands of their clients. 
A vast body of literature supports the view that borrower characteristics are highly 
influential determinants of repayment. There is also strong evidence that institutional 
characteristics are equally important and that both factors need to be taken into account 
if loan default is to be minimized (Derban, Binner, and Mullineux 2005). 
Regarding the poor borrower, ASA noted that difficulty in meeting family expenditures 
may leave a borrower no option but to spend the loan to cover such expenditures. The 
same study found that the poor did not invest all loan money in income-generating 
activities, but spent part of it making payments on previous loans and meeting family 
expenses. 
Basu (1997) examined why institutions remain unable to extend credit to rural poor 
people. His analysis indicated that, at best, poor peasants can offer as a mortgage an 
entitlement set comprising only future shares of their harvest—a commodity itself 
subject to risk. Loan repayment by borrower farmers is influenced by timeliness of input 
supply, participation in off-farm activities, and yield loss due to natural calamities, 
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among other things (Hundie, Belay, and Demeke 2004). Consequently, lenders cannot 
advance loans without risking extensive loss of loanable funds. It is also true that public 
perception of credit programs is an important factor influencing default. 
Studies in Africa have revealed a tendency for people to think that funds from the 
government are free and do not require repayment. Tunisia has had a strong tradition of 
non-repayment of government-provided loans (ENDA, 2005). Similarly, Makina and 
Malobola (2004) studied the causes of low repayment for South Africa’s Khula 
Enterprise Finance credits. They found that a major contributing factor for default was 
beneficiaries’ perception that the microloans were free government grants. 
In Nepal, for instance, the more efficient microfinance institutions managed by the 
private sector were found to be better-off than government-owned institutions. 
Efficiency may come from improvement in processes, computerization of management 
information systems, and improved financial management. Particularly with microcredit, 
small loans can be profitable only if administrative costs are reduced to a bare minimum. 
The Kenya Women Finance Trust’s strategy is to keep administrative costs down and 
link the growth in lending to the availability of funds. 
Regarding default in joint loan board programs, an impact study carried out by Kenya 
Consulting Associates attributed default to poor program management, which resulted in 
minimal follow-up on borrowers. The report noted that there are no systematic follow-up 
procedures. 
Furthermore, commercial law in Kenya provides a debtor’s limitation period. The law 
states,‖ If a creditor does not demand repayment of the loan from his debtor within six 
years of the loan, he cannot enforce his claim in the court in case the debtor refuses to 
pay‖ (Hussain 1978). 
Elsewhere, lenders of micro credit have been found to have limited, if any, means of 
mitigating damages in the event of default because poor people lack assets to back up 
their loans and poor countries lack civil infrastructure (such as adequate court systems) 
to collect bad debt. Without a safety net for loans in default, micro credit portfolios can 
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fail if borrowers perceive that there are no consequences for defaulting on their loans 
(Own contribution).  
It is also true that there are costs to a lending institution for being in arrears. Arrears 
deplete portfolio turnover and erode the image of the institution. It has been found that 
clients of such an institution will inform themselves of the chance that the institution will 
fail and that debts will begin to grow rapidly. Within the institution, personnel blame 
each other and the institution’s prestige plummets—which again compromises the 
institution’s sustainability (Own contribution). 
As quoted by Jemal Abafita; looking at the situation of Ethiopia empirical studies on the 
analysis of determinants of loan repayment and impact analysis are very few. Regarding 
loan repayment, an econometric estimation was conducted by Mengistu (1997) taking 
the case of micro enterprises in Awasa and Bahir Dar Towns. The analysis consisted of 
estimating two equations, one for loan repayment and the other for loan rationing. 
According to the estimation results (employing binomial probit model for loans 
repayment) he reported that the number of workers employed has positive relation with 
full loan repayment for both Towns, while loan size and loan diversion were negatively 
related. Age and weekly repayment period had positive relation with repaying loan in 
full for Awasa. In the case of Bahir Dar, loan expectation and number of workers 
employed have a positive relation with full repayment, while loan diversion and 
availability of other sources of credit have a negative impact. The predicted probabilities 
of full loan repayment were 53% and 78% for Awasa and Bahir Dar respectively. 
Accordingly, loan size, expectation for another loan and availability of other credit 
sources are positively related with loan granting without rationing. On the other hand, 
number of workers employed, supervision visits and loan diversion have negative 
impact. For the case of Awasa, five variables are significant; namely, loan size, age, 
education, and weekly repayment period and loan diversion. Literate borrowers and 
borrowers with relatively higher level of age were incorrectly rationed despite being 
good payers./Ibid/ 
                                                                                                                                        
28 
 
In another relevant study by Abreham (2002) an investigation of determinants of 
repayment status of borrowers and criteria of credit rationing were conducted with 
reference to private borrowers around Zeway area who are financed by the DBE. The 
estimation result employing tobit model revealed that having other source of income, 
education, work experience in related economic activity before the loan and engaging on 
economic activities other than agriculture are enhancing while loan diversion, being 
male borrower and giving extended loan repayment period are undermining factors of 
loan recovery performance. With regards to loan rationing mechanism, it was found that 
borrowers who secured high value of collateral and those with relatively longer period 
were favored while those with higher equity share and extensive experience in related 
activity were disfavored. This leads to the conclusion that the bank's rationing 
mechanism didn't much with the repayment behavior of the borrowers. 
Berhanu (1999) also used Wilcoxon test and found that health, education and 
consumption expenditures have increased after loan compared to that before loan. 
Employment and household income have also increased after the loan. But he found 
unsatisfactory results for saving mobilization, as POCSSBO did not attach the saving 
facility with its credit program or facility. Retta (2000) also reported a positive impact of 
microfinance on the living conditions of fuel wood carriers (WFCs), there by enhancing 
their economic empowerment. This was reflected in the rise of their income, expenditure 
and in their shift to other alternative income generating activities after the loan rather 
than engaging in fuel wood collecting, carrying and selling activity.  
Teferi (2002) in his study on Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) found out 
that credit scheme has made its own positive contribution to the beneficiaries in relation 
to income, access to educational facilities, medical facilities, household diet and savings. 
Bekele et.al. (2003), as cited in Jemal Abafita., employed a logistic regression model to 
analyze the factors influencing loan repayment performance of small holders in Ethiopia. 
The authors used data on 309 borrowers of input loans in the Oromia and Amhara 
National Regional states and found out that individuals who took larger loans had better 
repayment performances than those who took smaller loans. Further the results of the 
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study revealed that late disbursement of inputs purchased by the loan funds was an 
important bottleneck in loan repayment while livestock were found to be important in 
improving the farmers’ repayment performance.  
Given the contemporary salience and the future promise of microfinance as a poverty 
alleviating tool, researchers have studied various aspects of microfinance from a 
theoretical and from an empirical perspective. Focusing on La Paz, Bolivia, Navajas et 
al. (2003) have analyzed the ways in which changes in competition between lenders have 
affected the terms of loan contracts and the diligence with which borrowers repay their 
loans. Daru et al. (2005) describe the outcome of an International Labor Organization 
(ILO) sponsored study designed to alleviate the plight of poor borrowers in South Asia 
who often have great difficulty in repaying their loans because they are ―bonded to their 
employers.‖ McIntosh and Wydick (2005) have argued that competition between MFIs 
can give rise to situations in which the most impatient borrowers begin to obtain multiple 
loans and thereby create a negative externality that leads to less favorable equilibrium 
loan contracts for all borrowers. Andersen and Malchow-Moller (2006) have used a 
game theoretic model to show that the existence of a collateral requirement in connection 
with formal loans gives rise to a Nash equilibrium in which both informal and formal 
lenders earn higher profits. 
Karlan et al. (2006) have used experimental methods in Lima, Peru; to explain why 
MFIs have increasingly been moving away from group based lending practices. 
Katchova et al. (2006) point out that relative to static models, a dynamic model better 
explains the present experience with individual and group lending in developing nations. 
Karlan and Zinman (2007) have studied information asymmetries in lending by using a 
field experiment in South Africa. They find stronger evidence for the presence of moral 
hazard but weaker evidence in support of the existence of adverse selection. Simtowe et 
al. (2007) have used data from Malawi to conduct an empirical investigation of the 
salience of moral hazard in microfinance. This analysis shows that MFIs cannot rely on 
peer selection and pressure to reduce the incidence of moral hazard. Instead, in repeated 
borrowing and lending contexts, MFIs need to continuously evaluate the changing, and 
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typically growing, financial needs of the borrowers. Finally, using a cross-country 
perspective, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008) have studied the extent to which rating 
agencies have helped MFIs in raising funds. 
The significance of peer monitoring in improving repayments in group credit is 
highlighted by a number of authors. Stiglitz (1990), for example, observes that the major 
problem facing MFIs is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds 
so that the likelihood of repayments is enhanced. Stiglitz notes that a partial solution to 
this problem is peer monitoring: giving neighbors or group members the responsibility to 
monitor each other. The incentive for peer monitoring comes from the fact that peers are 
supposed to pay loans for any defaulting group members. Studying the incentive 
rationale for the use of group lending as a method of financing liquidity-constrained 
entrepreneurs, Che (2002) observes that the joint liability lowers the liquidity risk of 
default but creates a free-riding problem. Che points out that in the static setting, the 
free-riding problem dominates the liquidity risk effect, thus making group lending 
unattractive. However, when the projects are repeated over time, the joint liability 
feature provides the group members with a credible means of exercising peer monitoring 
and sanctioning, which can make the group lending attractive, relative to individual 
lending. 
2.2.2. Is Default Risk an Issue in Microfinance? 
Default risk refers to a situation where the lenders are unable to recover the loans that 
have been extended or the borrowers fail to fulfill their financial obligations at the 
stipulated time due to various reasons. In general, default risk is claimed to be a non-
issue in microfinance. Taking Grameen Bank as an example, since its inception, the bank 
has distributed around Tk347.75 billion (or an equivalent of US$6.55 billion) in loans. 
Of this amount, Tk313.11 billion (or US$5.87 billion) has been repaid. The bank claims 
a loan recovery rate of 98.4 percent in 2003, an improvement compared to the 95 percent 
recovery rate claimed in 1998. In short, micro lending is known to have very low default 
rate, such as in the case of Grameen Bank which has a default rate of as low as 2 percent.  
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However, many critics doubt this recovery rate, particularly on the definition that 
Grameen Bank uses to categorize loan as default as well as the method of recovering the 
loans being extended. Micro lenders have been reluctant to highlight the weaknesses of 
Grameen Bank mainly due to its well-known reputation as a symbol of microfinance. 
However, in the recent years, the repayment difficulties faced by Grameen Bank are 
even acknowledged by the founder himself, Mr. Yunus. Several factors have been 
attributed to the repayment difficulties such as political upheavals, the 1998 flood and 
management errors. Information lag due to inefficiency is also quoted as another reason, 
where the recovery rate of 95 percent was only true until 1996. 
More importantly, field investigations revealed that the high degree of loan recovery in 
microfinance is partly contributed by some element of ―forced-recovery‖ imposed on the 
borrowers, either directly or indirectly. Informal interviews with the villagers and direct 
observations in the villages seem to indicate that there are actually frequent incidences of 
default in microfinance. In some cases where the borrowers are not able to pay back their 
loans, they are pressured to repay with whatever means that they have. In several 
circumstances, the borrowers faced losses where their business or agriculture projects do 
not bear fruit but they still have to repay according to the agreement that they have had 
with the MFIs. As a result, these borrowers were forced to sell off their lands or 
whatever property that they have, making them poorer than they were before and 
sometimes even making them homeless. Obviously, in this case, the MFIs are successful 
in recovering the loan that they have extended but the true objective of microfinance of 
alleviating poverty and improving the living standard of the poor are clearly being 
ignored.(Own contribution) 
The role of sanctions in enhancing the willingness of individuals to repay their loans is 
also discussed in Besley and Coate (1995). They show how moderately successful group 
members may willfully decide not to repay their loans because of the burden of having to 
repay the unsuccessful members´ loan. They note however, that in the presence of strong 
social ties among group members, willful default is minimized because potential 
defaulters are afraid of facing sanctions from both the bank and the community. 
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2.2.3. Real Incidences of Defaults in Microfinance 
According to Kassim, Salina and Rahman (2008), it can be concluded that the MFIs are 
only concerned about extending financing without much effort being done to provide 
any form of post disbursement supervision. Post-disbursement supervision is highly 
relevant in ensuring the success of microfinance project due to the fact that around 80 
percent of the recipients of microfinance are illiterate women. Furthermore, around 82 
percent of these women had no business experience before joining the microfinance 
program, while the rest 18 percent had some basic business experiences. The illiteracy of 
the recipients is rather serious to the extent that some do not even know how to count the 
amount of money that they received from the MFIs. 
Commonly, the MFIs provide loan without any technical assistance except for some 
briefing of around five to ten minutes to the recipients. It should be emphasized that the 
technical assistance is just as important and should complement the financial assistance 
in ensuring the success of the business project. (Own contribution) 
Case 1: Lack of Post-Disbursement Supervision Leading to Moral Hazard 
In many instances, once the fund is being released to the recipient, there is no close 
supervision of how the fund is being utilize. This results in the tendency of moral hazard 
on the part of the recipients. For example, in a particular case, the recipient is supposed 
to expand her chicken rearing farm, has instead given the money to her husband on the 
pre-text of undertaking a more profitable business venture. However, the business 
venture did not turn in to be profitable, and as a result, the recipient failed to pay the 
installment of the microfinance loan. After a year, the original amount of loan became 
almost doubled and the recipient had to pay the debt by selling her house which made 
the family homeless. 
Case 2: Lack of Training on Basic Business Skills and Knowledge 
Several incidences of default happened due to lack of basic skills such as book-keeping 
or recording of sale transactions. As mentioned, based on a survey on the recipients of 
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microfinance loan from an MFI in Bangladesh, around 82 percent of respondents had no 
business experience before joining the microfinance program and only 18 percent had 
some business experiences. The lack of experience resulted in the recipients unable to 
manage their business projects effectively, leading to a business failure. In a specific 
case, a recipient had to close down a tea stall that had been set up using a microfinance 
facility due to lack of basic business skills and knowledge. Due to illiteracy, the recipient 
had difficulties to do calculations and keep track of the everyday sales. In the absence of 
systematic recording of profit or loss in the business, it was difficult for the recipient to 
estimate expenses that are made allowable by the available profits. As a result, a few 
months later the recipient had to close the stall and sold it off because of the failure to 
pay the weekly installments. This is a clear case of default case resulting from the lack of 
basic business skills and knowledge. 
Case 3: Lack of Health Awareness Resulting in the Need to Spend on Medical 
Expenses 
As a result of poverty and illiteracy, there is a general lack of awareness on the 
importance of sanitation and cleanness as well as the importance of healthy food intakes 
and disease prevention. Family member’s illness is one of the reasons leading to 
recipients to channel the funds provided by the MFIs to pay for medical treatment, 
resulting in default in payments. In a specific case, a goat-rearing project funded by an 
MFI turned out to be successful at the initial stage that it provides the recipient with 
some profit and the ability to repay. However, a family member’s illness led the 
recipient to sell-off the goats in efforts to pay for the medical bills. The recipient later 
defaulted on the payment. 
Case 4: Burdensome Immediate Repayment Schedule 
Most microfinance contracts require repayments to start immediately after the loan is 
disbursed. Since it is common to have weekly payment schedule, most payments 
normally start the following week after the loan has been disbursed. This payment 
arrangement proved to be a challenging situation for new and non-experienced recipients 
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since most projects undertaken by microfinance recipients need some incubation period. 
In a specific case, a woman failed to pay the weekly installments which started directly 
after the loan was being disbursed simply because her chicken-rearing activity had yet to 
turn in some profit. 
Case 5: Lack of Motivation to Improve Standard of Living 
It is often overlooked that the mindset of the poor and illiterate are very much 
different from those who are educated. The poor people have no incentive to 
give the best to ensure the success of a business project since their major concern 
is on meeting the daily consumption requirements or just to fulfill the basic 
needs. In a particular case, a recipient with five children were more concerned to 
make end meets by setting up a road-side stall and were not concerned about 
further improving their standard of living. Due to lack of motivation, the 
recipient had no effort to really give out the best that she could even though she 
was provided with the financial assistance. This would increase the likelihood of 
default of the loan being extended. 
2.2.4. Causes of Defaults in Microfinance 
Based on the real incidences of default mentioned above, in general, the causes of 
default can be divided into two categories: (i) weaknesses from the lender side, 
particularly in the funds administration by the MFIs; and (ii) moral hazard problem on 
the borrower side. 
a. Lender perspective -Weaknesses in funds administration: these are weaknesses 
relating to funds administration by the MFIs that provide the opportunities for the 
recipients to utilize the loans for other reasons than the original intentions. This 
increases the possibility of default by the recipients. 
                                                                                                                                        
35 
 
 Absence of post-disbursement monitoring system: in the absence of a close 
supervision on how funds are being disbursed, recipients tend to utilize the funds 
for other reasons than the original purpose that the funds were released for. 
 Lack of technical assistance given to the microfinance recipients: as mentioned, 
82 percent of the recipients had no business experience before joining the 
microfinance program, while the rest had some basic business experience. As a 
result, the recipients cannot handle their business effectively without basic 
technical assistance being provided by the MFIs. 
 Inexperienced field workers: the field workers who are working for the MFIs are 
lowly educated and lack of experience. As a result, they fail to deliver effectively 
the objectives of the MFIs to the recipients, what more to give motivations to the 
recipients. 
 Burdensome immediate weekly payment system: the fixed repayment system is 
difficult to be met by many recipients, depending on the nature of their business 
projects. Also, very frequent collection schedule increases the transaction costs to 
collect the installments for the MFIs. 
 Lack of common accessible database of the microfinance recipients: since there 
is no systematic database that keeps the record of the microfinance recipients, 
this provides the opportunity for the recipients to apply for more than one loan 
from various MFIs. When the recipients are over-stretched in their financial 
commitments, they are more likely to default on the installment payment. 
b. Borrower perspective - moral hazard problem: resulting from the lack of 
technical assistance and post-disbursement supervision, the followings are the 
consequences which result in greater possibility of default by the loan recipients: 
 Hiding business: majority of the recipients are women and in a male-
dominant society such as Bangladesh, women are normally obedient to 
whatever the requests of the husbands. In many cases, once the wife has 
secured a loan to run a particular business, the husband persuades the wife to 
                                                                                                                                        
36 
 
undertake more risky business that more likely to provide higher return. Thus, 
lack of proper monitoring system by the MFI could lead to recipients to 
undertake more risky business, thereby increasing the possibility of default by 
the borrower. 
 Family member’s illness: rather than utilizing the loans through the channel 
that has been agreed upon, the recipients spent it for more urgent and pressing 
reason such as for medication of the family member. There are also cases 
where the focus of attention has shifted to taking care of the sick ones, 
resulting in the business project to be abandoned. Other than illness, funds are 
also sometimes being spent for other expenses such as marriage and 
festivities. 
 Lack of motivations: the mindset of the poor which is more concern about 
meeting the basic needs does not provide them with the motivations to give 
out the best in conducting the business project. 
 Over-stretched financial commitments due to multiple borrowings from 
MFIs: amid the increased competition among the MFIs and the absence of a 
common database to keep track of the microfinance recipients, many 
recipients borrow from more than one MFIs, resulting in the difficulty to 
meet the multiple payment installments. 
 
CONCLUSION 
A number of lessons can be drawn from the literature reviewed. 
 Micro credit is important to the growth and development of micro enterprises. 
 Face unique problems of targeting, distinguishing between creditworthy and not-
so-creditworthy borrowers, and monitoring the productive use of loans 
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 Default on repayment poses a major challenge to the survival of micro credit 
programs 
 Character, capacity, and capital play a role in loan repayment. 
 The public perception that government credit is a grant influences default                  
;i.e. Default rates increase 
 The lending institution should maintain efficiency in terms of : 
 improved processes,  
 computerized information systems, and  
 Improved financial management to handle its credit programs effectively. 
 Poor management and a lack of effective legal infrastructure to prosecute 
defaulters encourage default.  
 Adopted strategies for minimizing default in micro credit: 
 imposing conditions to which members must adhere,  
 targeting women as borrowers,  
 doing repeat business with borrowers who have good repayment records, 
and 
 lending to groups to promote joint liability 
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CHAPTER III  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This section describes the methods used in carrying out this study. It explains the data 
types, sources, and procedures used for the comparative analysis, and it describes the 
data collection instruments and techniques and the sampling procedures followed. 
 
3.1. Data Types and Sources 
Both primary and secondary data sources were used in this study. Primary data were 
collected through questionnaires. Secondary data sources include information taken from 
official reports, file records, and statistics issued by the relevant institutions. In addition, 
secondary documented data were obtained from both published and unpublished 
literature related to the topic. 
3.2. Sample Size and Sampling Techniques 
The DECSI has made a total of twelve disbursements since its inception in 1997. This 
study, however, focuses on the period 2005-2009 during which a total of five 
disbursements were made (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009). Of the total clients 
benefited from the two sub-branches of DECSI’s work over that period, a sample of 100 
clients was selected for data collection concerning the reasons for default among those 
who did not repay and those who repaid slowly, and concerning the factors influencing 
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timely repayment by the regular borrowers. Using the 2009 repayment status, groups 
were classified into 3 categories: fully-paid groups, partially-paid groups and nothing-
paid groups. A stratified random sampling procedure was used to randomly select the 
sample groups from the three selected strata. A group was classified as fully paid if the 
2009 group loan was fully paid. It was classified as a partially-paid group if only part of 
the 2009 group loan had been paid at the time of the survey. And a group was classified 
as nothing-paid if no member had paid anything for the 2009 loan. 
Stratified sampling guarantees representation from each disbursement strata at one level, 
and representation of fully-paid groups, partially-paid groups and nothing-paid groups. 
Systematic sampling also was applied to capture clients as they come to repay loans. 
3.3. Data Collection Instruments 
Several data collection instruments were used during the study. Primary data were 
generated from two types of questionnaires. The first type comprised two questionnaires 
to be administered to defaulters, slow repayers, and regular borrowers. The 
questionnaires had four sections: section A inquired about the borrower’s personal and 
business details; section B sought information on causes of default or timely repayment; 
section C dealt with business performance; and section D addressed the effect of loan 
repayment on the enterprise, family, and community. 
The other type of questionnaire was used in interviews with board officials. It had three 
sections: section A inquired about the official’s personal details, including professional 
qualifications, work experience, and main responsibilities; section B sought the 
interviewee’s considered opinion on causes of default and factors influencing loan 
repayment; and section C dealt with the impact of loan repayment on the DECSI scheme. 
Secondary data were obtained from a number of data instruments used by the trade 
office. These instruments included the loan application form, the appraisal of the 
applicant, and the loan agreement form. The other tool was the account ledger for each 
group to which funds were disbursed. 
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3.4. Data Collection Procedures 
The data were collected at two levels. Primary data were obtained by administering the 
questionnaires to selected loan beneficiaries who defaulted and to borrowers who 
completed their loan repayments. 
Prior to its use in the field, the questionnaire was tested using board clients in each of the   
three categories who are based in the Town of Mekelle. Following this testing, research 
assistants went to the field under the guidance of an officer to help identify borrowers. 
The board clients’ questionnaire captured data on their demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, business characteristics, and causes for default or timely repayment. 
Additionally, a questionnaire was administered to the board staff to find out the board’s 
considered opinion on the causes of default and the factors influencing repayment. The 
questionnaire’s three sections asked about board officials’ professional qualifications, 
their duties, and the loan program’s performance. 
3.6. Data Analysis 
The study used a comparative analysis approach to investigate the causes of default in 
microfinance programs: a case study in DEBSI, Mekelle Town. To facilitate data 
analysis, questionnaires collected were serialized and coded before enter into Microsoft 
Excel software. After data screening, only 92 questionnaires were found suitable for data 
analysis. Data then were exported to SPSS statistical analysis software. Descriptive 
analyses tools, such as frequencies and percentages, were used to study the repayment 
performance and other relationships of interest. In addition, various qualitative analyses 
were applied to establish causes of default in repaying the board’s credit. Secondary data 
concerning board clients’ repayment performances were entered in Excel spreadsheets to 
compute relevant statistics. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION 
This section presents the study’s findings on the causes of default in a government micro 
credit program—specifically, the DECSI scheme. The average repayment delay period 
and default rates are estimated and factors that contributed to loan default and slow 
repayment are presented. 
4.1. DECSI Clients’ Profile 
Ninety-two clients who received loans from the two sub-branches of DECSI during the 
study period were analyzed. Two-thirds of the clients were repeat borrowers (having 
received other loans before or during the study period). About 70 percent of the clients 
were male. All clients were aged 28 to 79 years, with a mean of 47. Sixty-five percent of 
them were aged 40–59 years. Figure 1.1 shows the age distribution of the study sample. 
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                    Source: Researcher’s compilation based on questionnaire responses. 
As proved from the questionnaire responses, the education level of borrowers ranged 
from no education to postsecondary training. Ninety-one percent of the clients had either 
primary or secondary education, with 51 percent having secondary education. The great 
majority of the clients were married (86 percent); approximately 10 percent were single; 
and 4 percent were separated, divorced, or widowed. 
The amount of money disbursed to each client ranged between 1000 birr and 5000 birr. 
These loans were to be repaid over a period ranging from 12 to 18 months. At the time of 
the study, outstanding balances per slow-repaying or defaulting client went very high. 
Some clients had made no payments at all on their loan accounts. 
Board clients had varied amounts of business experience. The common type of 
businesses run by 73 percent of board clients fell mainly in regulated trade (retail). 
Manufacturing, motor vehicle repair, hotel and catering services and miscellaneous 
businesses together amounted to only 27 percent. 
 
Figure 1.1.  Age Distribution of Study Area 
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With respect to income levels, 65 percent of those interviewed said that their income 
level had improved to either an average or high extent since receiving the credit loan. 
About 85 percent had personal income above 1000 birr per month, with approximately 
45 percent reporting personal monthly income of more than 1800 birr. The major source 
of income among the borrowers was their business enterprise, although 34 percent had 
diversified, with farming or employment as their major source of income. 
4.2. Loan Default Analysis 
Because both slow repayment and default rates negatively affect the DECSI’s 
performance, identifying the average repayment delay and the default rate is important. 
Average Repayment Delay: Of the 92 DECSI beneficiaries studied, 45 exceeded the 
repayment periods stated in their loan agreements. The repayment delays described in 
figure 1.2 are the months between the agreed repayment periods and actual completion 
of the loans by the slow repayers. The analysis revealed that slow repayers delayed 
repaying their loans for 1 to 23 months. Most of them cleared their loans within five 
months after the expiration of the loan agreement period. 
                           Figure 1.2. Repayment Delays among Study Area    Slow Repayers  
 
 
               Source: Researcher’s calculations based on office records 
                                          Note: Of   the 92 borrowers studied, 45 failed to adhere to their repayment schedules. This   
                                                                            chart shows   their    periods of arrears. 
21-23 months (2.2%) 
11-15 months (6.7%) 
6-10 months (28.9%) 
1-5 months (62.2%) 
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    Table 1.3.  Descriptive Statistics on Repayment Delays among Slow Repayers 
                                                Number                                             
      Statistic                            of cases            Minimum          Maximum     Mean        SD        
 
Actual repayment period         45        13             35               20.51           4.794  
Repayment delay (%   45             5.56         191.67 31.4392          32.746 
Beyond agreed period)  
Delay in months  45  1           23 4.78  4.512 
  Source: Researcher’s calculations, based on office records, DECSI, Sub-branches at  
                  Mekelle Town. 
                Note: SD = standard deviation. 
Table 1.3 provides the descriptive statistics of the slow repayers over the study period. 
The repayment delay was calculated as the number of months delayed in completing a 
loan, divided by the agreed repayment period in months, and then multiplied by 100. The 
results indicate that the minimum repayment delay occurred among those who were to 
repay in 18 months (they delayed an average of one month); the maximum delay 
occurred among those who were to repay in 12 months (they delayed an average of 23 
months). Therefore, the average repayment delay among the DECSI’s slow-repayment 
borrowers was approximately 31 percent longer than the agreed period. In other words, a 
slow-repayment board client who received a loan to repay in 12 months was more likely 
to repay it in 16 months, a client given a loan to repay in 18 months was more likely to 
repay in about 24 months, and so on. 
Repayment and Default Rates: In this study, it was important also to compute the study 
area’s default rate for the DECSI scheme.  
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                             Table 1.4.  DECSI’s Repayment and Default Rates; study years 
DEBSI Performance 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Disbursement (Birr) 
16,149,885.00 29,007,850.00 57,872,400.04 
44,749,341.0
9 26,420,379.04 
Recovered funds  at 
the expiration of loan 
agreement(Birr) 
 
4,555,817.26 
 
15,244,445.78 
 
40,533,035.03 
 
 
24,859,701.0
8 
 
 
1,746,160.38 
 
Outstanding Balance 
(Birr) 
11,594,067.74 
 
13,763,404.22 
 
17,339,365.01 
 
19,889,640.01 
 
24,674,218.66 
 
Default rate (%) 71.79 47.44 29.96 44.45 93.39 
     
             Source: Researcher’s calculation, from the Archives of two-sub branch of DEBSI         
Table 1.4 shows the board’s performance in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 by 
comparing total disbursements with total repayments and outstanding balances at the 
ends of the loan agreement periods. The default rate, therefore, is based on outstanding 
balances at the ends of the agreed repayment periods. It is clear from the outstanding 
balances and amounts disbursed that the board experienced default rates of 71.79 
percent, 47.44 percent, 29.96 percent, 44.45 percent and 93.39 percent for 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively. The results give rise to an overall average default rate 
of approximately 57.41 percent. 
4.3. Slow-Repayment Borrowers 
Borrowers who exceed their agreed repayment schedules are viewed as a type of 
defaulter because they did not repay their loans on time. Therefore, it was important in 
this study to establish the causes of slow repayment.  
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Source: Researcher’s calculations, based on responses to study questionnaires 
Figure 1.3 shows the causes for default stated by the slow repayers. It emerges that 
diversion of funds and poor business performance were the key causes of untimely loan 
repayments. Other borrowers were affected by business closure or by having many 
dependents. 
4.4. Defaulters 
Using the responses gathered from the questionnaires, the study established a number of 
causes for default among DECSI clients.  
 
Figure 1.3. Causes of Default among Slow Repayers 
   
Other (5%) 
Many dependents (5%) 
Business closed (5%) 
Diversion of funds (50%) 
Poor business performance (35%) 
 
                                                                                                                                        
47 
 
Source: Researcher’s calculations, based on responses to study 
questionnaires 
Figure 1.4 provides a frequency distribution of the causes of default among the board’s 
clients. Thirty-six percent of the defaulters attributed their non-repayment to poor 
business performance. Twenty percent cited domestic problems, and another 10 percent 
admitted having diverted the funds to other unprofitable uses. Poor timing, tenancy 
problems, theft, and business closure also were named as causes for default, although on 
a small scale. 
The ―other‖ causes (10 percent) of nonpayment identified among the defaulting 
borrowers included harsh economic conditions, stiff competition, government policy 
banning certain activities, servicing of other loans, and bad debts on services offered to 
their customers. 
Owing to the sensitive nature of the issue of default, the study endeavored to find out 
whether household characteristics contributed to non-repayment. The study was 
Figure 1.4. Specific Causes of Default among Defaulters 
Theft/Robbery (6%) 
Many dependents (4%) 
Business closed (2%) 
Tenancy problems (6%) 
Poor timing (6%) 
Domestic problems (20%) 
Poor business 
performance (36%) 
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interested in establishing any relationship between a borrower’s number of dependents 
and the cause of default, or between the major source of income and the cause of default. 
         Table 1.5. Household Characteristics of DECSI Defaulters 
Characteristic   Frequency      Percent          Characteristic           Frequency              Percent 
Number of  
dependents                      Major source of income 
 
1   0  0  Farming   15  30 
2   2  4 Business enterprise  29  58 
3   7  14 Employment   5  10 
4   5  10 other (causal worker)  1  2 
   5 or more  36  72 
             Source: Responses to study questionnaires 
 
Table 1.5 shows that about three-quarters of the defaulters had five or more dependents, 
and that approximately 60 percent of the borrowers relied on the micro enterprise for 
most of their income.  
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Table 1.6. Relationships between Household Characteristics and Causes of Default 
                                                              Causes of default 
Number of       Poor business     Diversion of    Domestic     Tenancy       Many   Other         Total 
dependents       performance        funds               Problems     problems     depen. 
   2   0   0  1  0  0             1           2 
    3   3   0  2  0  0       2          7 
   4   3   0  0  1  0       1          5 
   5 or more 12   5  7  2  2              8         36 
Total  18   5  10  3  2       12       50 
                                           Causes of default 
Major source   Poor business        Diversion of      Domestic         Other           Total 
of income   performance           funds         problems  
Farming   5  3  3  4  15 
Micro enterprise 12  2  7  8  29 
Employment  1  0  0  5  6 
Total   18  5  10  17  50          
                         Source: Responses to study questionnaires. 
Table 1.6 provides cross-tabulations between the number of dependents and the cited 
cause of default and between the major source of income and the cited cause of default. 
The cross-tabulations show that many defaulters who had a large number of dependents 
also experienced poor business performance, diverted funds, or had domestic problems. 
It is surprising, however, that only two defaulters cited ―many dependents‖ as the cause 
of default (both of whom had five or more dependents). The associated p-value of the 
cross-tabulation between many dependents and cause of default was 0.534 (53.4 
percent), meaning that many dependents and cause of default are statistically 
independent. 
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Table 1.6 also shows that many defaulters who relied for income on the micro business 
alone experienced poor business performance. Because approximately 60 percent relied 
on the business as the main income source, the vulnerability of the micro enterprise to 
poor business performance was revealed. The cross-tabulation for major source of 
income and cause of default had a p-ratio of 0 percent, which indicated that the major 
source of income and the cause of default are statistically dependent. 
4.5. Comparative Analysis of the Causes of Default among Slow Re-
payers and Defaulters 
The analysis of causes of default revealed that there are variations on causes of default 
among the two categories—slow repayers and defaulters. 
       Table 1.7. Comparison of Causes of Default between Slow Repayers and 
Defaulters 
Percent  
       Cause of default        Slow Repayers   Defaulters 
Poor business performance     35   36 
Diversion of funds to unprofitable use   50   10 
Business closure      5   2 
Many dependents      5   4 
Domestic problems      0   20 
Other        5   28 
                Source: Responses to study questionnaires 
 
Table 1.7 compares the percentage of respondents in each category who cited each 
reason as the main cause for default. The results indicate that poor business performance 
is a key cause of default identified by both slow repayers and defaulters. Although half 
of the slow repayers attributed their default to diversion of funds to unprofitable uses, 
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only 10 percent of the defaulters did so. Hence, although diversion may increase the 
possibility for defaulting, it may not be the major cause. Domestic problems and other 
causes (including harsh economic conditions, stiff competition, servicing of other loans, 
and bad debts) also were important, especially among defaulters. 
4.6. DECSI’s Perspective on the Causes of Default 
Christen (1997) suggests that contemporary microfinance programs have countered this 
view by demonstrating that the responsibility essentially relies upon factors within the 
control of the lending institution, that is, organizational factors such as staff inefficiency 
and skill as well as clear communication of repayment expectations. 
The DECSI believes that some defaults occur because of limitations of the board, 
whereas other defaults are borrower driven. Accordingly, therefore, a number of factors 
were identified as causes of loan default from the board’s perspective. 
Board employees were unanimous in their belief that failure to prosecute defaulters was 
an important cause of loan default. Default cases are referred to the state counsel, which 
is based in Mekelle. Furthermore, proper follow-up of clients is constrained by 
inadequate funding for operations and maintenance resources. For instance, transport 
operating budgets have been declining, a situation that does not facilitate consistent 
monitoring or follow-up on defaulters. Chances of default also increase when loan 
amounts given are lower than the amounts requested. And the board’s institutional 
structure was described as too rigid and thus not responsive to changing client needs. 
Board members also believe the length of time it takes for a potential borrower to apply 
and get the loan has an effect on the use and repayment of the loan. In the DECSI 
program, it takes at least two months for an applicant to apply and receive a loan. 
The board also acknowledges that its records on clients are inadequate for efficient 
program management. Although the board has computer facilities, those facilities do not 
contain appropriate software to process borrower information promptly or to track 
potential defaulters. Data relating to borrowers are manually kept in files and account 
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ledgers, but those files and books were found to be too bulky and tedious for the board’s 
sole clerical officer to handle. Because basic data on loan repayment are not in a readily 
and conveniently available format, cases of loan over- and under-repayment exist. 
Regarding loan repayment, default was associated with diversion of funds to 
unprofitable uses, like paying school fees. Other factors included a lack of discipline in 
the use of working capital, poor management skills, and poor business performance. In 
some cases, defaults were believed to be a problem of attitude, with beneficiaries 
assuming that government funds are grants and need not be repaid. 
The study also found that board members do have measures to deal with various 
categories of default. Cases of chronic default are forwarded to the state counsel for 
prosecution. Some occasional defaulters are threatened with sale of their security to 
recover the outstanding balances, and others simply are counseled on the importance of 
repaying the loan on time. These measures have improved loan recovery, albeit 
marginally. Despite the measures, the board believed that the default trend is increasing. 
4.7. Factors Influencing Repayment of Loans among Regular Borrowers 
and Slow Re-payers 
To establish factors that influenced repayment of loans disbursed by the DECSI, 
questions were posed to both regular and slow-repaying borrowers. The regular 
borrowers, who made timely payments in accordance with their agreed payment 
schedules, were asked to state what prompted them to repay on time; and the slow 
repayers were asked to state what caused them to repay the remaining balance after they 
failed to repay the loan as scheduled. The study sought to discover links between the 
motivations for repayment and default. 
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                           Source: Researcher’s calculations, based on responses to study  
                                         questionnaires. 
Figure 1.5 shows key factors found to influence board clients to repay on time. As the 
figure illustrates, regular borrowers repaid their loans on time for three reasons: (1) 
because they wished to build credibility with the trade office (46 percent), (2) because 
they associated timely repayment with good business performance (42 percent), and (3) 
because they wished to get another loan (12 percent). 
The study also was keen to discover what triggered slow-repaying borrowers finally to 
repay the outstanding balance.  
Figure 1.5. Reasons for On-Time Repayment among DECSI Borrowers 
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Source: Researcher’s calculations, based on responses to study questionnaires. 
Figure 1.6 shows the stated reasons for eventual repayment of a trade loan. It reveals that 
55 percent of the slow repayers eventually repaid because of a desire to fulfill the 
outstanding obligation. However, 30 percent repaid because they urgently needed 
collateral deposited at the trade office, and 5 percent repaid because they feared losing 
that security deposit. Issuance of demand notices and improved business triggered full 
repayment of the loan for 10 percent of the slow re-payers. 
 
4.8. Effect of Repayment on Enterprises, Families, and the Community 
The study also sought to discover what repayment burdens placed on the enterprise 
might cause default. Responding to study questionnaires, one-third of the study area 
indicated repayment had no effect on the enterprise. The remaining two-thirds, however, 
said that repayment had led to a reduction in their stock levels. Some said that they were 
Figure 1.6.Reasons for Eventual Repayment of the Loan by Slow Repayers 
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not able to make any savings because they used profits to repay the loans. Other 
borrowers said that they were using means beyond business to repay their loans. Some 
loan recipients even admitted suffering from depression as a result of the repayment 
burden, and they said the depression was affecting relationships with customers and was 
leading to poor business performance. As a result of repayment, some businesses had 
closed their doors. Those who were repaying were doing so to maintain trust with the 
loan office or to avoid prosecution. Some borrowers explained that repayment was a 
burden only when sales were low. 
With respect to the burden on borrowers’ families, less than 20 percent said that 
repayment had no effect on the family. The remaining 80 percent said that repayment 
reduced family income and that children’s school fee payments might be compromised. 
They noted that repayment was expensive because they had to spend a lot more on 
transportation. The impact of repayment was felt greatly during times of ill health or 
other emergencies. Some respondents also revealed that they sold property to repay their 
loans. Families who repaid poorly said that they lived in fear and suffered 
psychologically when they saw any government vehicle. For that reason, they tried to 
repay so as to maintain a good relationship with government. 
Sixty-six percent of the borrowers also were aware of the effect of their repayment on 
the community. They said that community members benefited by loan repayments. Some 
respondents noted that good repayment encouraged other community members to take 
loans and start businesses that provided needed goods and services to the community. 
They also pointed out that loan defaults cause the community to lose those goods and 
services and that poor loan repayment makes community members hesitant to take any 
loans for development. 
4.9. The Effect of DECSI’s Screening Mechanism on Default  
Hunte (1996) argues that default problems destroy lending capacity as the flow of 
repayment declines, transforming lenders into welfare agencies, instead of a viable 
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financial institution. It incorrectly penalizes creditworthy borrowers whenever the 
screening mechanism is not efficient. 
Figure 1.7. The Screening Process Mechanisms Used By DECSI 
 
                            Source: Responses from interview made with the boards of DECSI 
Figure 1.7 depicts the screening process mechanisms used by DECSI. Using these steps, 
the institution used to identify the borrower either as creditworthy or non-creditworthy 
which may penalize the creditworthy borrowers due to insufficiency of the technique. 
According to Grameen Bank model, the prospective clientele is identified after the 
purpose, functions, and mode of operation are explained to the population of the area 
covered. However, this issue is not incorporated in the screening mechanism which has 
been used by DECSI.  
A vast body of literature supports the view that borrower characteristics are highly 
influential determinants of repayment. There is also strong evidence that institutional 
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characteristics are equally important and that both factors need to be taken into account 
if loan default is to be minimized (Derban, Binner, and Mullineux 2005). However, these 
two factors seem to be denied in the screening process mechanism of DECSI. Hence, 
identifying clients in this manner may not resolve the problem of direct targeting by 
specifying the members’ eligibility requirements on the basis of asset ownership. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final section of the report presents conclusions drawn from the findings and offers 
suggestions to strengthen the DECSI and better equip it to deal with the problem of slow 
repayment and default. 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
Study findings revealed that default on loans disbursed by the DECSI is strongly related 
to the major source of income. Borrowers’ major source of income was found to be the 
business enterprise, and the predominant cause of default was poor business 
performance. Therefore, it can be concluded that borrowers who depend on their poorly 
performing businesses default. 
Timely repayment of loans disbursed by the board, on the other hand, is influenced by 
good business performance and by the desire to build credibility with the trade office. 
Among slow re-payers who eventually repay their loans, however, repayment 
motivations include the desire to fulfill their outstanding obligations and the urgent need 
to reclaim or the fear of losing the security deposited as collateral for the loan. To a 
lesser extent, demand notices influenced repayment among slow-repaying borrowers. 
Business performance in this study is viewed in terms of enterprise profitability. 
Therefore, board clients who had profitable businesses were able to repay their loans, 
whereas business losses led clients to default or repay slowly. The effect of poor 
business performance was confirmed further by the revelations of some borrowers that 
they used sources of income other than their micro enterprises to repay loans. This 
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finding indicates that borrowers who lack other sources of income easily could default if 
their businesses performed poorly. 
Notwithstanding those factors, however, and drawing from the literature reviewed, this 
study observed that loan default averaging 57.41 percent is very high. Sustainable 
microfinance programs, such as the Grameen Bank, were found to have low default rates 
(roughly an average of 3 percent). Therefore, reducing the DECSI’s default rate is a 
survival priority for the loan program. Sufficient repayment rates are necessary to 
facilitate re-disbursement of financing, and they contribute to achieving the board’s 
objectives. 
Findings of this study indicated, however, that there is a mismatch between the board’s 
mandate and its capacity to handle core functions. It has a small staff whose operations 
are further constrained by limited operations and maintenance resources. As a result, 
although the DECSI has the potential to perform well in providing and recovering 
government micro credit disbursements, it lacks the necessary support. 
This study also concluded the board’s manual information systems are inadequate. For 
instance, manual recordkeeping is not suitable for effective program management. With 
the records as they presently are kept, the board cannot detect slow-repaying borrowers 
and potential defaulters—a fact further confirmed by the small number of borrowers who 
have received loan repayment demand notices. Although not many borrowers were 
served with demand notices, the notices did trigger repayment whenever they were used. 
This study further observed that not prosecuting defaulters contributed to the rising trend 
in program loan defaults. Therefore, the options open to the board in dealing with either 
slow re-payers or defaulters are ineffective. Default rates are likely to rise and may 
negatively affect the board’s operations. 
The study also found that delays in disbursing funds to borrowers may be as great as two 
months from the time a loan application is filed. Timely disbursement enables a 
borrower to match acquired resources to business needs. With such delays, there is a 
possibility that business priorities and market conditions will have changed by the time 
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funds are received. That situation can lead to a diversion of funds for some unprofitable 
uses and so to an increased chance of loan default.  
 
5.2 Recommendations 
This study has found that improving the DECSI’s performance is a prerequisite to make 
it more effective in carrying out its mandate and providing technical support to micro 
enterprises so as to improve their profitability. To that end,  
I. The DECSI should consider the following recommendations: 
 
 Strengthen its management information systems to produce up-to-date loan 
repayment statements for borrowers and to enable early detection of potential 
default and slow-repayment problems. Doing so will help the board take 
quick follow-up actions, such as providing debt counseling or issuing demand 
notices. 
 Strengthen its staff by enhancing the capacity of its computer applications. 
This will enable optimal use of the available computer facilities, speed up 
loan processing, and ensure timely disbursements. 
 Intensify its follow-up on borrowers to improve recovery of outstanding loan 
balances accruing to slow re-payers and to prosecute defaulters. 
 Revise its borrower appraisal instrument to help identify deserving but 
vulnerable micro entrepreneurs. Vetting should determine how much debt the 
borrower can handle comfortably, his or her income streams, and any other 
obligations that might interfere with repayment. Doing so can enable the 
board to provide the borrower with appropriate counseling and support to 
avoid repayment default. 
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 Carry out a workload analysis to establish the optimal trade office staffing 
levels for consideration by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
 Establish common financial information sharing center so that the institution 
will have the chance of controlling any financial aspects 
 
II. The Ministry of Trade and Industry should consider the following 
recommendations: 
 
 Increase the staffing levels in the trade office to facilitate efficient service 
delivery in terms of quick processing of applications, disbursement of loans, and 
monitoring of loan usage. 
 Provide to DECSI sufficient resources for operations and maintenance to permit 
efficient monitoring of borrowers and to cover the expense of prosecuting those 
who default. 
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Appendix: A 
Questionnaire 
Dear Sir/madam: 
My name is Teshale Birhanu and I am a master student in Business Administration/MBA 
in finance/ at Mekelle University under the supervision of Assistant   Professor   Mr. G. 
Sirinivasa Rao. I am writing this to invite you to participate in research in the form of a 
questionnaire. My project thesis is entitled as “CAUSES OF DEFAULT IN 
MICROFINANCE PROGRAMS, a case study in Dedebit, mekelle town”. The aim of this 
study is to determine the causes that enhance the defaults of borrowers. For this matter, 
you are selected as a one who could provide me relevant information. The information 
supplied by you will be treated as confidential and access to the questionnaires is 
restricted to my supervisor and my-self. Completion of the questionnaire is voluntary. If 
you decide that you no longer want to be involved in this study you are free to withdraw 
at any time without adverse consequences. If you would like to obtain a summary of the 
results of this research, I am happy to send you copies of it.  
Please put the response for each item: 
 Circle the correct letter for choose questions. 
 Provide your explanation in the space provided for open ended questions. 
Please feel free to contact me on 0912210732 or teshalebir@yahoo.com  in regards to 
any queries you may have, or my supervisor, Mr. G. Sirinivasa Rao on 0914216055 or 
qtsrinivas@gmail.com . 
 
Thank you for your sincere cooperation and for sparing of your precious time. 
 
ENNUMERATOR____________________ 
DATE______________________________ 
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1: PERSONAL DETAILS 
1.1 Area of Borrower____________________  
1.2 Age__________ 
1.2 Sex__________ 0. Female     1. Male 
1.3 Marital Status______   1. Single      2. Married    3.divorced     4. widowed 
1.4 Educational level _______ 1. Illiterate     2. Grade1-8    3. Grade 9-12 
                                                       4. Above grade 12                                                             
2. Number of dependents: 1. 1     2.2      3.3     4. 4      5. 5 or more 
3.  LOAN UTILIZATION 
3.1 What was the purpose for which the loan was taken? ____  
1. Retail  
2. Manufacturing 
3. Motor vehicle repair 
4. Hotel and catering services 
                          5. Miscellaneous Business __ 
3.2. Was the amount of loan you took enough for the purpose intended? 
            1. Yes      0. No 
3.3. If no, what was the amount you requested? Birr--------------------------------- 
3.4. Did you spend the entire loan on purposes specified in the loan agreement 
                1. Yes               0. No 
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3.5. If no. What was/were the reason(s) for spending part/entire loan on   
          non intended purposes? _____ 
1. The loan amount was not enough for the intended purpose 
2. The loan agreement did not coincide with my initial intention 
3. Market problem  
4. To repay another loan  
5. To make a more profitable business 
6. Other (specify) ___________________ 
4.  INCOME AND WEALTH 
4.1. Did you have a source of income (cash income) for your household    
                    before joining the program loan? ____1. Yes 0. No 
 
              4.2. If yes, what was/were the source(s) and level of your income?      
Source Annual Income 
  
  
  
  
 
       4.3. What was your annual income from activities financed by the loan  
                during the last 12 months? ] 
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1. Below Birr 1000                     4. Between Birr 3001-4000             
2. Between Birr 1001-2000       5. Between Birr 4001-5000 
3. Between Birr 2001- 3000      6. Above Birr 5000 
5. Non defaulters: what prompts you to repay the loan on time? 
 
1. To build credibility with the trade office 
2. Because of good business performance 
3. To get an other loan 
6. Slow re-payers: what are the causes which force you to default? 
 
1. Diversion of funds 
2. Poor business performance 
3. Business closure 
4. Having many dependents 
7. Slow re-payers: what forces you to repay the remaining balance after you fail to repay 
it as scheduled? 
                  1.   Desire to complete outstanding loan 
                   2. Urgent need for collateral used to secure the loan 
 3. Fear of loosing security deposits 
 4.  Receipt of demand notice 
                    5.  Improvement of business 
 
8. For Defaulters: what are the causes which lead you to default? 
1. Poor business performance 
2. Domestic problems 
3. Diversify the funds to unprofitable uses  
4. Poor timing 
5. Theft 
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6. Business closure 
9. What is the Effect of repayment on enterprises? 
1. Has no effect on the enterprises 
2. Leads to a Reduction in your stock levels 
3. Not able to make any savings out of your profits 
4. Results in high depression and which in turn affects the relation ship 
with  
             customers and Leading to poor business performance 
 
 
10. What is the Effect of repayment on families?  
1. Repayment has no effect on families 
2. It reduces family income and children’s school fees may be  
                  compromised 
3. Sells some properties to repay the loan 
 
11. What is the Effect of repayment on the community? 
1. Repayment has no effect on community 
2. Good repayment encourages other community members to take loans  
                  and start businesses that provide needed goods and services to the  
                    community 
3. Loan default causes the community to lose those goods and services 
 
Boards’  Perspective on the Causes of Default: 
12. Your qualification/position/----------------------------------- 
13.What is your believe regarding the causes of default? 
1. Failure to prosecute defaulters 
2. Lack of proper follow-up due to inadequate funding for operations and   
                      maintenance resources 
3. When loan amounts given are lower than the amounts requested 
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14.Have you ever observed that the length of time it takes for a potential borrower to 
apply and get the loan has an effect on the repayment of the loan?  
       
                1. Yes                      0. No 
15.How long does it take to complete the application process? 
 
1. Two  months 
2. Four months 
3. Six months 
4. More than six months 
 
16. What is your attitude towards the information system which has been used by 
DECSI? 
1. Its records on clients are inadequate 
2. Facilities do not contain appropriate software to process borrower 
information promptly 
3. Data relating to borrowers are manually kept in files 
4. Cases of loan-over and under-repayment exist 
5. Properly designed information system is there. 
17. Which factors could be considered as cause of default? 
1. Diversion of funds to unprofitable uses 
2. Lack of discipline in the use of working capital 
3. Poor management skills 
4. Poor business performance 
 
18. What measures do you have to deal with various categories of defaults? 
1. Sale of defaulters’ security to recover the outstanding balances 
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2. Cases of long-lasting default are forwarded to the state counsel for   
                  prosecution 
3. Counsel the defaulters on the importance of repaying the loan on time 
19. If you believe that you have the above measures; what is the trend of default 
currently? 
1. Decreasing,               0. Increasing 
 
20. What screening mechanism do you use to identify creditworthy borrowers from non-
creditworthy borrowers before loan disbursement? 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------- 
                 
THANK YOU!!! 
 
Appendix: B 
Performance of DEBSI from the year 2005-2009 as of December 31 
South-sub branch DECSI 
Year sex Load Dispersed Loan Recovered Outstanding 
2005 Male 2,498,800.00 688,402.29 1810397.71 
Fem. 3,803,850.00 998,725.22 2,805,124.78 
 Total 6,302,650.00 1,687,127.51 4,615,522.49 
 Regular:    
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2006 Male 15,000,000.00 13, 504,502.25 1,495,497.75 
Fem. 2,893,700.00 436,834.93 2456865.07 
Urban    
Male 840,300.00 118,332.40 72,1967.60 
Fem. 1,728,800.00 233,547.35 1,495,252.65 
 Total 20,462,800.00 14,293,216.93 6,169,583.07 
 
 
2007 
Regular:    
Male 2,996,700.00 227,160.35 2,769,539.65 
Fem. 4,940,200.04 795,760.62 4,144,439.42 
Urban    
Male 222,400.00 193,501.31 28,898.69 
Fem. 356,700.00 43,819.85 312,880.15 
 Total 8,516,000.04 1,260,242.13 7,255,757.91 
 
 
2008 
Regular:    
Male 4,984,797.92 4,635,997.92 348,800.00 
Fem. 5,208,413.98 4,629,413.98 579,000.00 
Urban    
Male 17,828,800.00 16,221,175.49 1,607,624.51 
Fem. 4,219,228.19 596,728.19 3,622,500.00 
 Total  32,241,240.09 26,083,315.58 6,157,924.51 
 
 
 
2009 
Regular:    
Male 5,649,276.70 1,760,218.35 3,889,058.35 
Fem. 3,587,196.77 474,895.77 3,112,301.00 
Urban    
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Male 2,141,014.42 601,514.42 1,539,500.00 
Fem. 5,509,291.15 2,099,291.15 3,410,000.00 
 Total  16,886,779.04 4,935,919.69 11,950,859.35 
Source: Compiled by Researcher from the Archives of South-sub branch of DECSI 
 
Appendix: c 
Performance of DEBSI from the year 2005-2009, as of December 31 
North-sub branch of DECSI 
Year sex Load Dispersed Loan Recovered Outstanding 
 
 
 
2005 
Regular:    
Male 3,126,700.00 1,103,059.50 2,023,640.50 
Fem. 2,564,200.00 663,798.25 1,900,401.75 
Urban:    
Male 1,200,000.00 90,282.00 1,109,718.00 
Fem. 2,373,115.00 899,100.00 1,474,015.00 
Rural:    
Male 510,000.00         105,000.00 405,000.00 
Fem. 73,220.00 7,450.00 65,770.00 
 Total  9,847,235.00 2,868,689.75 6,978,545.25 
 
 
 
 
Regular:    
Male 1,869,300.00 20,893.85 1,848,406.15 
Fem. 2,316,350.00 362,313.40 1,954,036.60 
Urban    
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2006 Male 1,648,000.00 265,831.50 1,382,168.50 
Fem. 2,521,100.00 470,205.10 2,050,894.90 
Rural:    
Male 146,150.00 -149,495.00 295,645.00 
Fem.  44,150.00 -18,520.00 62,670.00 
Total 8,545,050.00 951,228.85 7,593,821.15 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 
Regular:    
Male 37,322,500.00 33,598,859.50 3,723,640.50 
Fem. 3,828,800.00 844,398.25 2,984,401.75 
Urban    
Male 3,245,000.00 2,135,282.00 1,109,718.00 
Fem. 4,715,000.00 3,240,985.00 1,474,015.00 
Rural:    
Male 122,550.00 -595,611.85 407,310.00 
Fem. 122,550.00 48,880.00 73,670.00 
 Total 49,356,400.00 39,272,792.90 9,772,755.25 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
Regular:    
Male 4,573,701.00 -595,611.85 5,169,312.85 
Fem. 3,640,650.00 173,415.85 3,467,234.15 
Urban    
Male 1,473,500.00 -408,460.70 1,881,960.70 
Fem. 2,670,500.00 -12,542.80 2,683,042.80 
Rural:    
Male 86,850.00 -317,475.00 404,325.00 
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Fem. 62,900.00 -62,940.00 125,840.00 
 Total  12,508,101.00 -1,223,614.50 13,731,715.50 
 
 
 
2009 
Regular:    
Male 3,203,300.00 -1,959,107.02 5,162,407.02 
Fem. 2,861,800.00 -177,966.77 3,039,766.77 
Urban    
Male 1,173,000.00 -177,966.77 2,286,536.05 
Fem. 2,295,500.00 -874,718.75 3,170,218.75 
Rural:    
Male ----------- ----------- 279,545.30 
Fem. ---------------- ------------------- 93,075.00 
 Total  9,533,600.00 
 
-3,189,759.31 
 
14,031,548.89 
                   Source: Compiled by Researcher from the Archives of South-sub branch of  DECSI 
                              Note: ------ not available 
 
 
 
 
 
 
